Ransomware Tabletop Exercise (Cross-Industry)
A generic, reusable tabletop exercise template for any organization. Run it on paper in about 90 minutes. Replace bracketed details — industry, systems, "operations" — to fit your organization. No real organization names are used.
This exercise is aligned to the NIST Cybersecurity Framework and NIST SP 800-61 incident-handling guidance and designed to support ISO/IEC 27001 incident-management practices. It does not by itself satisfy any framework or ensure compliance.
Scenario summary
Core systems begin failing, and the organization discovers that files are being encrypted and a ransom note has appeared. The encryption is still spreading, the entry point and the extent of any data theft are unknown, and operations depend on systems that are going dark. Over the exercise the team contains the incident, decides whether and how to keep operating, weighs the ransom question without committing to it prematurely, manages customers, regulators, and media, and faces the possibility that data was stolen before it was encrypted.
Exercise objectives
- Detect, declare, and contain a ransomware incident within a target time, including the decision to isolate systems despite the operational cost.
- Maintain or safely suspend critical operations during the outage, with a clear decision owner.
- Determine the entry point and whether data was exfiltrated, with a defined point for treating it as a data breach.
- Frame the ransom question (pay / do not pay / not our decision) with legal, insurance, and ethical inputs, without deciding reflexively.
- Communicate accurately with employees, customers, regulators, and media through single owners.
- Preserve evidence and sequence recovery so systems are restored clean, not re-infected.
Participants and roles
- Incident commander — senior executive who runs the response.
- IT / security team — containment, forensics, and recovery.
- Operations lead — the business impact and continuity decisions.
- Legal / compliance — breach determination, regulators, ransom and sanctions questions.
- Communications / PR — employee, customer, and media messaging.
- Finance / insurance liaison — cyber-insurance engagement and cost picture.
- Executive sponsor — approves major trade-offs and external statements.
- Facilitator — delivers injects, keeps time, captures decisions (not a participant).
Injects
T+0 — Systems are failing. Delivered to: IT help desk / on-call → incident commander. Core systems start going down across the organization. A technician finds files being encrypted and a ransom note on a shared system. The spread does not appear to have stopped.
- What is the trigger and the authority to declare a security incident and stand up command?
- Who do you notify first, inside and outside IT?
- What do you preserve before anyone changes anything?
T+20m — Isolate or not. Delivered to: IT / security + operations lead. Containing the spread likely means cutting network connections and taking systems offline — which would halt operations that are still running.
- Who decides to isolate, knowing it stops work, and on what basis?
- What must keep running, and can it be protected while the rest is cut?
- How do you tell the organization what is happening without tipping off an active attacker unnecessarily?
T+45m — Operations on manual. Delivered to: operations lead. Whatever the organization does, the systems people rely on are dark. Teams fall back to manual workarounds, and a critical customer or dependency needs an answer about whether you can deliver.
- How long can operations run in manual mode, and what breaks first?
- What do you tell customers or dependents who need a commitment now?
- Who owns the decision to keep going versus formally suspend a service?
T+1h30 — The ransom note, and a deadline. Delivered to: incident commander + legal. The note demands payment by a deadline and threatens to leak data. The entry point and whether anything was stolen are still unknown.
- How do you frame the ransom question without deciding reflexively?
- What legal, insurance, sanctions, and ethical inputs do you need, and from whom?
- Who ultimately owns this decision, and is it even the organization's alone to make?
T+3h — Was data taken? Delivered to: IT / security + legal. Forensics finds signs that data may have been copied out before encryption, but cannot yet confirm what or how much.
- At what point does this become a data breach with notification obligations?
- Who decides that, and what evidence do they need?
- How do you avoid both over- and under-stating what happened?
T+6h — It gets out. Delivered to: communications + executive sponsor. Customers, employees, or the press learn something is wrong — a down service, a leaked note, a rumor — and the organization has not yet spoken.
- What do you say while facts are still unconfirmed, and to whom first?
- How do you keep one consistent message across every audience?
- Who speaks for the organization?
T+Day 2 — Recovery, carefully. Delivered to: IT / security + operations lead. Backups exist but their integrity is unverified, and restoring too fast risks bringing the threat back. Pressure to "just get us running" is intense.
- How do you sequence recovery so systems come back clean?
- How do you verify backups and confirm the attacker is out before reconnecting?
- Who signs off that a system is safe to return to service?
Contingency — The leak site. Delivered to: incident commander. The attackers publish a sample of stolen data on a leak site, or a regulator opens an inquiry, while recovery is still in progress.
- What changes now that exposure is public and confirmed?
- How do you manage notification, regulators, and affected parties at once?
After-action checklist
- Time from detection to declaration and containment, measured against target.
- Isolation decision made with a clear owner and rationale, including the operational trade-off.
- Critical operations maintained or safely suspended, with the decision documented.
- Ransom question framed with legal, insurance, sanctions, and ethical inputs — not decided reflexively.
- Breach-determination point reached and documented, with notification owners identified.
- Communication consistent and accurate across employees, customers, regulators, and media.
- Recovery sequenced for clean restoration, with backup integrity verified before reconnection.
- Evidence preserved throughout for forensics, reporting, and any later inquiry.
Frequently asked questions
How long does this ransomware tabletop exercise take?
About 90 minutes, covering detection, the isolation decision, manual operations, the ransom deadline and clean recovery.
Does it work for any industry?
Yes. Replace the bracketed details, such as industry, systems and operations, with your own. The library also has industry versions, such as Line Stop for manufacturing and City Hall Offline for local government.
Should our team decide whether to pay the ransom during the exercise?
The goal is to frame the decision, not make it on reflex: who has the authority, and what legal, insurance, sanctions and ethical inputs you need. Many organizations find they've never agreed who decides.
Is this exercise aligned to NIST or ISO 27001?
It's aligned to the NIST Cybersecurity Framework and NIST SP 800-61 incident-handling guidance, and designed to support ISO/IEC 27001 incident-management practices. It doesn't by itself satisfy any framework.