Poisoned Well: A Compromised Open-Source Dependency Ships in Your Product
Technology tabletop exercise scenario · Software Supply Chain Attack
The library is in half the internet's dependency trees, including yours. Overnight it turns out that for weeks, its releases carried credential-stealing code from a hijacked maintainer account — and your product shipped it to customers. You're the victim. You're also the vector.
This advanced scenario runs security, engineering, and executive leaders through a real software supply-chain compromise: scoping exposure through lockfiles and build caches when your published SBOM flatters reality, rotating what the malicious code could have touched, and the disclosure race — telling customers enough, fast enough, knowing attackers read advisories too. Then the deeper rebuild: pipelines that verify what they consume, and an honest relationship with the open-source commons your business is built on. Because modern software is mostly other people's code — and this is the day that stops being an abstraction.
1 hr 30 minAdvanced
Technology
What this scenario tests
- Whether your team can scope a poisoned dependency across releases, builds, and customer versions
- What your own secrets and pipelines were exposed to — and how fast you rotate
- How you time customer disclosure when attackers read advisories too
- Whether your pipeline verifies what it consumes — or just trusts the registry
Who it's for
IT & Security Team · Executive / C-Suite · Legal & Compliance